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Despite the fact that conceptual models of individual decision making under risk are de-
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ifications (Luce vs. Fechner), with and without accounting for contextual utility, for two
different conceptual models (expected utility and rank-dependent expected utility) using in-
and out-of-sample selection criteria. We find drastically different inferences about structural
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fit of the data both in- and out-of-sample.
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1 Introduction
Virtually all conceptual models of risky choice, including expected utility theory (EUT)
and the behavioral alternatives such as prospect theory, are deterministic. The deterministic
nature of the theories presents a challenge for applied economists attempting to economet-
rically estimate risk preferences in a sample of individuals. In essence, the analyst must
make assumptions about the decision making process that go above and beyond the content
of the theory, making it difficult to conduct clean tests of the underlying theory itself and
to confidently identify underlying structural parameters. While a few previous studies have
analyzed the extent to which different stochastic error specifications influence estimates of
risk preferences (e.g., Hey, 2005; Loomes, 2005), there have been new developments in the
field (e.g., Wilcox, 2011) that have not been addressed in previous model comparisons, and
there has been an almost exclusive focus on the ability of models to fit the data in-sample.
The focus on in-sample fit is particularly important in determining which decision making
theory, EUT or a behavioral alternative, best describes lottery choices. EUT is a relatively
parsimonious theory, characterizing risk preferences simply by the curvature of the utility
function over income or wealth. Some popular functional forms such as constant relative
(or constant absolute) risk aversion consist of a single parameter. Behavioral theories often
proceed by adding parameters to the basic EUT set-up. Cumulative prospect theory, for ex-
ample, allows for different degrees of curvature in the gain and loss-domains and for additional
parameters describing the extent to which individuals under- or over-weight low probability
events (both in the gain and loss domains). Given the additional parameters, there might be
a tendency for such behavioral models to over-fit the data, and while in-sample test statis-
tics, such as Akaike or Bayesian Information Criteria, suggest improvements in model fit, this
is no guarantee the model will perform better predicting out-of-sample. Although several
previous studies have compared different decision making models under risk (Harless and
Camerer, 1994; Hey and Orme, 1994), and Carbone and Hey (2000) have attempted to rec-
oncile differences between studies based on differential assumptions made about how choice
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errors are modeled, to our knowledge previous research has not systematically compared
different error specifications and risk models insofar as their ability to predict out-of-sample.
Because most experimental studies are performed with a relatively small sample of sub-
jects, it would seem that most analysts are attempting to extrapolate risk preferences out-
of-sample to the more general population, and as such, studying out-of-sample prediction
performance appears a worthwhile line of inquiry. Judging out-of-sample prediction per-
formance is not always easy for discrete choice problems, and as such, we turn to the out-
of-sample-log-likelihood function approach long used in the marketing literature for model
selection (Erdem, 1996; Roy et al., 1996) and further elucidated in the economics literature
by Norwood et al. (2004,?).
The purpose of this paper is to use several in- and out-of sample model selection criteria to
determine which stochastic error specification and theoretical model best fits lottery choice
data gathered in an experimental setting. In particular, we compare two different error
specifications (Luce vs. Fechner), with and without accounting for Wilcoxs (2011) contextual
utility specification, for two different conceptual models (EUT and rank-dependent EUT)
using in- and out-of-sample selection criteria. Moreover, we further investigate Harrison and
Rutstro¨ms (2009) claim that a combined model (combining EUT and rank-dependent EUT)
leads to improved inferences.
The next section of the paper describes the laboratory experiment we conducted to elicit
preferences for competing lotteries. Then, we describe the competing approaches used to
estimate risk preferences, after which we present the results from the competing models.
Following this discussion, we discuss different model selection criteria and indicate the best
fitting models. The last section concludes.
3
2 Experimental Procedures
2.1 Description of the experiment
A conventional lab experiment was conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects consisted of undergraduate students at the University of Ioannina, Greece and
were recruited using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). During the recruitment,
subjects were told that they would be given the chance to make more money during the
experiment.1
Subjects participated in sessions of group sizes that varied from 9 to 11 subjects per ses-
sion (all but two sessions involved groups of 10 subjects). In total, 100 subjects participated
in 10 sessions that were conducted between December 2011 and January 2012. Each session
lasted about 45 minutes and subjects were paid a 10 participation fee. Subjects were given
a power point presentation explaining the lottery choice tasks as well as printed copies of
instructions. They were also initially given a five-choice training task to familiarize them
with the choice screens that would appear in the tasks involving real payouts. Subjects were
told that choices in the training phase would not count toward their earnings and that this
phase was purely hypothetical.
Full anonymity was ensured by asking subjects to choose a unique three-digit code from a
jar. The code was then entered at an input stage once the computerized experiment started.
The experimenter only knew correspondence between digit codes and profits. Profits and
participation fees were put in sealed envelopes (the digit code was written on the outside)
and were exchanged with digit codes at the end of the experiment. No names were asked at
any point of the experiment. Subjects were told that their decisions were independent from
other subjects, and that they could finish the experiment at their own convenience. Average
total payouts including lottery earnings were 15.2e(S.D.=4.56).
1Subjects were told that “In addition to a fixed fee of 10, you will have a chance of receiving additional
money up to 25. This will depend on the decisions you make during the experiment.” Stochastic fees have
been shown to be able to generate samples that are less risk averse than would otherwise have been observed
(Harrison et al., 2009).
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2.2 Risk preference elicitation
We elicited risk preferences using the popular Holt and Laury (2002) multiple price list
(MPL) task, at two payout (low vs. high) amounts. The baseline H&L MPL presented
subjects with a choice between two lotteries, A or B, as illustrated in Table 1. In the first
row, the subject was asked to make a choice between lottery A, which offers a 10% chance
of receiving 2 and a 90% chance of receiving 1.6, and lottery B, which offers a 10% chance
of receiving 3.85 and a 90% chance of receiving 0.1. The expected value of lottery A is 1.64
while for lottery B it is 0.475, which results in a difference of 1.17 between the expected
values of the lotteries. Proceeding down the table to the last row, the expected values of
both lotteries increase, but the rate of increase is larger for option B. For each row, a subject
choose A or B, and one row was randomly selected as binding for the payout. The last row
is a simple test of whether subjects understood the instructions correctly.2 The high payout
task is identical to the control (shown in Table 1) except that all payouts are scaled up by
a magnitude of five.
Table 1: The H&L Multiple Price List
Lottery A Lottery B EVA
(e)
EVB
(e)
Difference
(e)
Open CRRA interval if
subject switches to Lot-
tery B (assumes EUT)p e p e p e p e
0.1 2 0.9 2 0.1 3.9 0.9 0.1 1.64 0.475 1.17 −∞ -1.71
0.2 2 0.8 2 0.2 3.9 0.8 0.1 1.68 0.85 0.83 -1.71 -0.95
0.3 2 0.7 2 0.3 3.9 0.7 0.1 1.72 1.225 0.5 -0.95 -0.49
0.4 2 0.6 2 0.4 3.9 0.6 0.1 1.76 1.6 0.16 -0.49 -0.15
0.5 2 0.5 2 0.5 3.9 0.5 0.1 1.8 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14
0.6 2 0.4 2 0.6 3.9 0.4 0.1 1.84 2.35 -0.51 0.14 0.41
0.7 2 0.3 2 0.7 3.9 0.3 0.1 1.88 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68
0.8 2 0.2 2 0.8 3.9 0.2 0.1 1.92 3.1 -1.18 0.68 0.97
0.9 2 0.1 2 0.9 3.9 0.1 0.1 1.96 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37
1 2 0 2 1 3.9 0 0.1 2 3.85 -1.85 1.37 +∞
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not
shown to subjects.
216 out of 100 subjects failed to pass this test concerning comprehension of lotteries and were omitted
from our sample.
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Instead of providing a table of choices arrayed in an ordered manner all appearing at
the same page as in H&L, each choice was presented separately showing probabilities and
prizes (as in Andersen et al., 2011). Subjects could move back and forth between screens
if they wanted to revise their choices. Once all ten choices in a table were made, the table
was effectively inaccessible. In addition to the choices shown in Table 1, subjects also made
a similar set of ten choices except the magnitudes of all payoffs were scaled up by a factor
of five. The order of appearance of the set of ten choices (low vs. high payouts) for each
subject was completely randomized to avoid order effects Harrison et al. (2005). An example
of one of the decision tasks is shown in Figure 1. For each subject, one of the choices was
randomly chosen and paid out.
Figure 1: Example Decision Task
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3 Structural estimation of risk preferences
3.1 Conceptual specification: Expected utility vs. Rank depen-
dent utility theory
To estimate risk preferences, we follow the framework of Andersen et al. (2008). Let the
utility function be the CRRA specification:
U(M) =
M1−r
1− r (1)
where r is the CRRA coefficient and where r = 0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r > 0
denotes risk aversion behavior and r < 0 denotes risk loving behavior.
If we assume that expected utility theory (EUT) describes subjects risk preference tasks,
then the expected utility of lottery i can be written as:
EUi =
∑
j=1,2
(p(Mj) · U(Mj)) (2)
where p(Mj) are the probabilities for each outcome Mj that are induced by the experi-
menter (i.e., columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 in Table 1).
Despite the intuitive and conceptual appeal of EUT, a number of experiments suggest
that EUT often fails as a descriptive model of individual behavior. Although there are many
proposed alternatives to EUT, here we consider Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) Quiggin
(1982), which was incorporated into Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative prospect
theory. RDU extends the EUT model by allowing for non-linear probabilitiy weighting
associated with lottery outcomes. To calculate decision weights under RDU, one replaces
expected utility in equation (2) with:
RDUi =
∑
j=1,2
w((p(Mj)) · U(Mj)) =
∑
j=1,2
wj · U(Mj)) (3)
7
where w2 = w(p2 + p1)− w(p1) = 1− w(p1) and w1 = w(p1) with outcomes ranked from
worst (outcome 2) to best (outcome 1) and w(·) is the weighting function. We assume w(·)
takes the form proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992):
w(p) =
pγ
(pγ + (1− p)γ)1/γ (4)
When γ = 1, it implies that w(p) = p and this serves as a formal test of the hypothesis
of no probability weighting.
3.2 Stochastic error specification: Fechner vs. Luce
To explain choices between lotteries, one option is to utilize the stochastic specifica-
tion originally suggested by Fechner (1966) and popularized by Hey and Orme (1994). In
particular, the following index:
∇EUF = (EUB − EUA)/µ (5)
can be calculated where EUA and EUB refer to expected utilities (or rank-dependent
expected utilities) of options A and B (the left and right lottery respectively, as presented
to subjects), and where µ is a noise parameter that captures decision making errors. The
latent index is linked to the observed choices using a standard cumulative normal distribution
function Φ(∇EU), which transforms the argument into a probability statement.
There are two observationally equivalent interpretations of the Fechner error specification.
The most natural, given the set-up above, is that the term µ literally captures the effect of
decision making errors on the part of the subjects. Another way to interpret this speciation is
through the random utility framework (McFadden, 1974). In this framework, utility consists
of a systematic component, EUA, observable to the analyst, and a stochastic component,
εA, unobserved by the analyst but presumed known to the subject. In the random utility
framework, the probability of choosing option A over B is the probability that EUA−EUB >
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εB − εA. If the difference is distributed normally with mean zero and standard deviation µ,
then the probability of choosing A over B is given by Φ(∇EU) which, of course, is the same
expression shown above.
An alternative to the Fechner error specification, is the Luce error (Luce, 1959) popular-
ized by Holt and Laury (2002). In this case the index in (5) can be written as:
∇EUL = exp(EUB/µ)
exp(EUA/µ) + exp(EUB/µ)
(6)
3.3 Contextual utility
Wilcox (2011) proposed a “contextual utility” error specification which modifies the Fech-
ner and Luce error specifications, respectively as:
∇EUF = (EUB − EUA)/c/µ (7)
and
∇EUL = exp(EUB/c/µ)
exp(EUA/c/µ) + exp(EUB/c/µ)
(8)
In (7) and (8), c is a normalizing term, defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in
a lottery pair minus the minimum utility over all prizes in the same lottery pair. It changes
from lottery pair to lottery pair, and thus it is said to be contextual. The contextual utility
correction is basically a way to accommodate lottery-specific heteroskedasticity.
3.4 Estimation
After defining the conceptual model, error specification, and contextual specification, the
conditional log-likelihood can then be written as:
lnL(r, µ; y,X) =
∑
i
((lnZ|yi = 1) + (ln(1− Z)|yi = −1)) (9)
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where Z = Φ(∇EU j) for the Fechner or the Fechner with contextual utility error story
(j = F,CF ) and Z = ∇EU j for the Luce or the Luce with contextual utility error story
(j = L,CL). yi = 1(−1) denotes the choice of the option B(A) lottery in the risk preference
task i. Subjects were allowed to express indifference between choices and were told that
if that choice was selected to be played out, the computer would randomly choose one of
the two options for them and that both choices had equal chances of being selected. The
likelihood function for indifferent choices is constructed such that it implies a 50/50 mixture
of the likelihood of choosing either lottery so that (9) can be rewritten as:
lnL(r, µ; y,X) =
∑
i
((lnZ|yi = 1) + (ln(1−Z)|yi = −1) + (1
2
lnZ+
1
2
ln(1−Z)|yi = 0)) (10)
Equation (10) is maximized using standard numerical methods. The statistical specifi-
cation also takes into account the multiple responses given by the same subject and allows
for correlation between responses by clustering standard errors, which were computed using
the delta method.
Instead of discriminating between EUT and RDU models, one could allow the data
generating process to admit more than one choice models. Harrison and Rutstrom (2009)
allowed more than one process to explain observed behavior instead of assuming that the data
are generated by a single process. They estimated a model where some choices were allowed
to be EUT-consistent and other choices were allowed to be Prospect Theory-consistent (which
is also equivalent to the rank dependent model in our experimental design) and found roughly
equal support. A mixture model poses a different question to the data. As Harrison et al.
(2012) noted, “if two data-generating processes are allowed to account for the data, what
fraction is attributable to each, and what are the estimated parameter values?”3
Let piEUT denote the probability that EUT is correct and piRDU = 1 − piEUT denote the
3Note that with the mixture specification we adopt, choices as opposed to subjects are categorized as
completely EUT or RDU. Although it is possible to rewrite the likelihood in (11) such that the mixture is
defined over subjects, Harrison and Rutstrom (2009) discuss how allowing choices across the same subject
to differ, is consistent with experimental evidence that task domain can influence the strength of support for
EUT. Similarly, our approach allows us being agnostic about the interpretation of the mixing probability.
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probability that the RDU model is correct. We can then replace (10) with:
lnL(rEUT , rRDU , γ, µ; y,X) = ln(piEUT × LEUT + piRDU × LRDU) (11)
3.5 Estimated risk preferences
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the implications of different assumptions
about error specification and conceptual model, and illustrate how these choices can lead to
significantly different characterizations of risk preferences; facts which make necessary the
possibility to discriminate between models based on model fit criteria.
Tables 2 and 3 show the estimated parameters from the EUT, RDU and mixture models
when we assume Fechner or Luce error, with and without contextual utility. First compare
the conceptual models, EUT and RDU, under the assumption of a Fehcner or Luce error
specification without accounting for contextual utility. Results show that subjects are on
average risk averse (estimates of r span between 0.638 to 0.682) and that the introduction
of probability weighting does not have a significant effect on risk aversion. This is mainly
because the estimate for γ in the probability weighting function of the RDU model is very
close to 1. Thus in the context of EUT and RDU the choice between a Fechner and a Luce
error specification does not seem to have a substantive effect on implied risk preferences.
However, when we consider the mixture model with Fechner or a Luce error, dramatically
shifts in implied risk preferences occur. First note, that the mixture probabilities piEUT and
piRDU are reversed in magnitude depending on which error specification is assumed. Under
Fechner error, roughly 14% of choices are explained by EUT (86% by RDU) while under
Luce error, roughly 85% of choices are supported by EUT (15% by RDU). In addition, the
estimated risk aversion coefficients imply risk loving preferences for EUT and risk aversion
for RDU under a Fechner error, while it is the exact opposite for the Luce error story. Clearly,
the results regarding underlying risk preferences are highly sensitivity to assumptions about
error specification, a fact which may well cause some skepticism over previous analyses
11
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reporting a single specification.
Now we turn to the impact of contextual utility. The EUT model is least affected by the
introduction of contextual utility in both the Fechner and Luce error specification. Although,
the CRRA estimates are lower in magnitude as compared to the non-contextual utility
specifications (compare for example, the 0.58 estimate with 0.68 for the Fechner error), the
estimates still imply significant risk aversion. The most significant effects are found in the
RDU specifications. CRRA coefficients span around zero, implying risk neutrality, while γ
is estimated to have an unusually large value of 3. While large, this particular value for
γ, is not totally unrealistic, and Figure 2 shows it implies significant under-weighting for
all probabilities. In fact, it implies that subjects totally ignore choices with probabilities
lower than 0.2. The most commonly observed values for γ, e.g. when γ = 0.6, also imply
under-weighting for probabilities larger than 0.35.
Figure 2: Comparison of probability weighting functions for three gamma (g) values
The introduction of a mixture specification not only produces different results as com-
pared to the non-contextual utility counterparts, but it also produces different character-
izations of risk preferences depending on whether the Fechner or Luce error are assumed.
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For example, under the Fechner error, the mixture probabilities imply that about 31.6%
of all choices are EUT consistent while under the Luce error only about 6% of the choices
are consistent with EUT. Under the Fechner error, the risk aversion coefficients imply risk
aversion for EUT and risk neutrality of RDU while both CRRA estimates under the Luce
error specification span around zero implying risk neutrality. Note that under Luce error,
piEUT fails to reject the null, which implies that the mixture model could collapse to the RDU
specification. In addition, γ values are estimated at the more commonly observed values of
0.4 and 0.5, respectively.
Taken together, the results in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that the menagerie of error
stories that one could adopt for modeling risk preference estimation can lead to a variety of
characterizations of risk preferences. In fact, in Tables 2 and 3, the estimated coefficient
or relative risk aversion spans across models from a low of -0.632 (extreme risk seeking)
to a high of 0.687 (extreme risk aversion). Moreover, the estimate of the shape of the
probability weighting function under RDU goes from γ = 0.391 (extreme under-weighting
of low probability events) to γ = 0.9 (near linear probability weighting implying EUT) to
γ = 3.345 (under-weighting of all probabilities) depending on what is assumed about the
error and contextual utility specification. Thus, it is critically important to be able to select
between competing models based on model fit criteria.
4 Model selection criteria
4.1 Information criteria
Information criteria like the Akaikes information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian infor-
mation criterion (BIC) are common measures of goodness of fit; however, the statistics do
not reveal how well a model fits the data in an absolute sense, i.e., there is no null hypothesis
being tested. Nevertheless, these measures offer relative comparisons between models on the
basis of information lost from using a model to represent the (unknown) true model.
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Table 4 shows that based on AIC and BIC criteria, the contextual utility specifica-
tions are always preferred over their non-contextual utility counterpart specifications. When
comparing between EUT, RDU and the mixture specifications, AIC and BIC coincide in
indicating that the Luce error with contextual utility (for EUT) and the Fechner error story
with contextual utility (for RDU and mixture) are the error stories best fitting the data.
When comparing between models, the mixture specification with Fechner error and con-
textual utility shows the lowest AIC/BIC values.
Table 4: Information criteria and out-of-sample Log-Likelihood function summary statistics
AIC BIC OSLLF
EUT
F 1501.23 1512.08 -759.04
CF 1451.26 1462.12 -733.91
L 1480.19 1491.05 -747.64
CL 1442.37 1453.23 -729
RDU
F 1501.89 1518.17 -759.35
CF 1411.53 1427.81 -714.01
L 1480.5 1496.78 -747.69
CL 1417.28 1433.56 -715.76
Mixture
F 1437.74 1464.88 -724.7
CF 1397.88 1425.01 -705.56
L 1446 1473.13 -730.44
CL 1403.21 1430.35 -710.06
Note: CF=Fechner error with contextual utility, CL=Luce error with contextual
utility, F=Fechner error, L=Luce error. Best fitting model is indicated in bold.
4.2 Non-nested tests
The classical approach for testing between non-nested models is the Vuong test (Vuong,
1989). The Vuong test is a model selection test that compares between competing mod-
els and chooses the best model based on some predefined criteria. The Vuong test, as
many other model selection criteria, is based on the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion
(KLIC), which measures the distance between a hypothesized likelihood function and the
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true likelihood function. The null hypothesis of the Vuong test is:
H0 : E[ln
f(Yi|Xi; θf )
g(Yi|Xi; θg ] = 0 (12)
where θf and θg are parameters and f(·), g(·) are the likelihood functions of the two com-
peting models. The null in (13) implies that the two models are equivalent. The alternative
hypothesis favors the model with the higher average log-likelihood, if it is significantly greater
than the average log-likelihood of the competing model.
Because the Vuong test is only normally distributed asymptotically, small sample sizes
may pose a problem. A non-parametric alternative to the Vuong test is the Clarke test
(Clarke, 2003). The Clarke test is a paired sign test of the differences in the individual
log-likelihoods from two non-nested models. The null hypothesis is that the probability of
the log-likelihood paired differences being greater than zero is equal to the probability of
the log-likelihood paired differences being less than zero, which in essence is a binomial test
with p = 0.5. The Clarke test is similar to the Wilcoxon sign-rank test, but without the
additional assumption that the distribution of paired differences is symmetric.
If the models are equally close to the true specification, half the log-likelihood differences
should be greater than zero and half should be less than zero. If one model is “better”, then
more than half the log-likelihood differences should be greater than zero. The null hypothesis
of the Clarke test is:
H0 : median of lnf(Yi|Xi; θf )− lng(Yi|Xi; θg) = 0 (13)
Table 5 shows results from Vuongs tests which are performed between error specifications for
the EUT, RDU and the mixture models. We first compare the errors with contextual utility
versus the errors without contextual utility. The large positive values, and the corresponding
low p-values, indicate that the null that the two competing models are equivalent is rejected
in all cases. In fact, the contextual utility specification is favored against the non-contextual
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utility specification across EUT, RDU and the mixture models.
Table 5: Vuongs non-nested tests
Vuong statistic p-value
EUT
CF vs. F 3.324 0.000
CL vs. L 2.927 0.002
CF vs. CL -3.038 0.999
RDU
CF vs. F 4.251 0.000
CL vs. L 3.451 0.000
CF vs. CL 6.568 0.000
Mixture
CF vs. F 3.872 0.000
CL vs. L 3.838 0.000
CF vs. CL 1.158 0.123
Note: CF=Fechner error with contextual utility, CL=Luce error with
contextual utility, F=Fechner error, L=Luce error.
Next, we compare the Fechner and Luce error specifications with contextual utility. The
large negative value for EUT favors the Luce error while for RDU the Fechner error is
favored. For the mixture model, we fail to reject the null when we compare between the two
contextual utility specifications, although the result is marginally not significant in favor of
the Fechner error. In all, results from Vuongs tests support the results from the AIC and
BIC model selection criteria.
Vuongs test is suitable for non-nested models, thus we do not compare error specifications
between EUT, RDU and the mixture models since these are, by construction, nested in each
other. For example, one can test whether the mixture model collapses to EUT or RDU by
testing whether the mixture probabilities are statistically significantly different from zero. Or
one can test whether RDU collapses in EUT by testing whether γ = 1. For the Fechner error
specification with contextual utility (note that although this specification is not favored by
Vuongs test, the test marginally fails to reject the null), Wald tests in Table 2 show that it
neither collapses to either EUT or RDU, nor does RDU in the mixture specification collapses
to EUT.
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Table 6 shows results from Clarkes non-parametric test. For each model (EUT, RDU,
mixture), we first compare the contextual utility with the non-contextual utility counterparts.
Each comparison involves two, one-sided tests. For EUT, RDU and the mixture models, the
Fechner error with contextual utility is favored as compared to the non-contextual utility
counterpart. The Luce error with contextual utility is favored in the RDU model, while
Clarkes tests show that in EUT and the mixture specification Luce error with and without
contextual utility are equivalent.
Further comparisons, show that the Fechner error with contextual utility is favored for
RDU and the mixture specifications. For EUT, Clarkes test shows that Luce error with
contextual utility performs better than Fechner error with contextual utility, while it is
equivalent with the Luce error without contextual utility. This is an indication that inferences
that involve assumptions about transitivity between pairs of models tested, may not follow
in these types of tests.
4.3 Out-of-sample predictions
The out-of-sample log likelihood (OSLLF) criterion evaluates models by their fit out of
sample. In essence, the OSLLF approach uses one set of data to estimate the parameters
of the model, and then, given these parameters, calculates the likelihood function values
observed at out-of-sample observations. The OSLLF value is calculated by using out-of
sample observations to calculate the likelihood function:
Iˆ(f(·)|Y ) =
N∑
i=1
ln[f(yi|θˆf,−i)] (14)
where θˆf,−i is the parameter vector estimated without the ith set of observations. The
OSLLF value can be calculated in several ways (Norwood et al., 2004). The estimate θˆf,−i
could be calculated using cross-validation where θˆf,−i is estimated using every observation
except i. This is referred to as “leave one out at a time forecasting.” Alternatively, one could
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Table 6: Clarkes non-parametric non-nested tests
EUT
H1 : Median of CF − F > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 890, p = 0.5) = 0.0078
H1 : Median of CF − F < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 790, p = 0.5) = 0.9931
H1 : Median of CL− L > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 836, p = 0.5) = 0.587
H1 : Median of CL− L < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 844, p = 0.5) = 0.432
H1 : Median of CF − CL > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 620, p = 0.5) = 1.00
H1 : Median of CF − CL < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 1060, p = 0.5) = 0.00
H1 : Median of CF − L > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 836, p = 0.5) = 0.587
H1 : Median of CF − L < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 844, p = 0.5) = 0.432
RDU
H1 : Median of CF − F > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 950, p = 0.5) = 0.00
H1 : Median of CF − F < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 730, p = 0.5) = 1.00
H1 : Median of CL− L > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 926, p = 0.5) = 0.00
H1 : Median of CL− L < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 754, p = 0.5) = 1.00
H1 : Median of CF − CL > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 1030, p = 0.5) = 0.00
H1 : Median of CF − CL < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 650, p = 0.5) = 1.00
Mixture
H1 : Median of CF − F > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 966, p = 0.5) = 0.00
H1 : Median of CF − F < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 714, p = 0.5) = 1.00
H1 : Median of CL− L > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 838, p = 0.5) = 0.548
H1 : Median of CL− L < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 842, p = 0.5) = 0.471
H1 : Median of CF − CL > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 897, p = 0.5) = 0.003
H1 : Median of CF − CL < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 783, p = 0.5) = 0.997
H1 : Median of CF − L > 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 947, p = 0.5) = 0.00
H1 : Median of CF − L < 0 Binomial(n = 1680, x ≥ 733, p = 0.5) = 1.00
Note: H0 : Median of model f − g = 0 for all tests, where f , g =CF , CL, F , L and
CF=Fechner error with contextual utility, CL=Luce error with contextual utility,
F=Fechner error, L=Luce error
20
partition the observations into groups where each group is iteratively omitted and θˆf,−i is
estimated. Then, the omitted group of observations can be used to calculate the OSLLF.
This procedure is known as grouped-cross-validation. In what follows, we carry out group-
cross validation with individuals being the partitions, where each partition contains twenty
observations (as many as the choices of the subject). Essentially, we leave one subject (and
their associated 20 choices) out at a time, estimate the model, and calculate (14) for the
subject. The process is repeated for every subject in the sample.
Table 4 reports OSLLF values for each of the error specification for each conceptual
model (EUT, RDU and the mixture model). The results reveal that the contextual utility
specifications rank higher than their non-contextual utility counterparts across all models.
For EUT, the error specification that ranks highest is the Luce error with contextual utility
while the Fechner error with contextual utility ranks higher for RDU and the mixture model.
Across all error specifications and conceptual models, the Fechner error with contextual
utility ranks highest both in terms of OSLLF.
4.4 Conclusion
To derive estimates of individuals risk preferences, analysts have to have some mechanism
for translating the conceptual models of risky decision making into an empirical model that
includes stochastic errors. The results presented in this paper reveal that seemingly innocu-
ous assumptions about this stochastic process can lead to substantially different inferences
about risk preferences. Indeed, one can estimate parameters consistent with a high level of
risk seeking or a high level of risk aversion depending on how errors are incorporated into
the statistical model; a finding which suggests caution in naively assuming adopting a single
error specification.
A battery of in- and out-of-sample model selection criteria suggest that the model that
best fits our data is an EUR-RDU mixture model assuming a Fechner error with contextual
utility. We find that 32% of the sample is characterized by EUT with a coefficient of relative
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risk aversion equal to 0.4, and 68% is characterized by RDU with a coefficient of relative
risk aversion statistically indistinguishable from zero but with a probability weighting func-
tion implying significant overweighting of low probability outcomes and under-weighting of
moderate to high probability outcomes.
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